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UNION SECURITY IN WAR-TIME
By LuciL. LOmEN
(Continued)*
Aw~a DENiED
In July, 1943, Business Week summarized union maintenance in the
following words:
"Fostered with vigor and persistence by NDMB, and by its
successor, the National War Labor Board, membership
maintenance has, in two years, developed from what was
hailed as 'a clever compromise' designed to settle a thorny
labor dispute to a nearly universal union pattern covering the
nation's basic industries."90
From an extraordinary provision, it became a fundamental provision to
be included in almost every directive. Because of this, the bases for
denial of the clause are all the more important and are an essential
to complete understanding of the Board's position in regard to union
security.
Violation of the no-strike pledge where there are no mitigating
circumstances is a standard bar to a maintenance provision. A unanimous decision of the Board in the Monsanto Chemical Company
case'- denied both check-off and maintenance of membership because
a strike was called in spite of the union's assurances that it would not
use the strike as a weapon to secure a settlement of its disputes with
the management. The decision to call the strike had been given by
the union's leaders, which placed responsibility for the strike squarely
on the union. The directive ordered that no form of security should
be granted until the union demonstrates that it has adopted a change
of attitude in regard to the use of the strike during the war period.
However, the Board declared that it would keep in touch with the
case to prevent the company's taking advantage of the refusal to
grant union maintenance. Declared the Board, in its opinion:
"The important point for all concerned to remember is that
when labor agreed to forfeit its right to strike for the duration
of the war the government provided it with an orderly and
impartial tribunal to settle its disputes with industry. So long
as the National War Labor Board functions, there is neither
need nor justification for strikes. Certainly it must be clear
to everyone that the War Labor Board as an agency of
the federal government and acting under Executive Order
should not and will not be swayed by economic pressure
brought to bear by either management or labor."
Seven months after the union's strike, it was awarded a maintenance
92
clause, the Board finding that it had "learned its lesson.'
* The first installment of this article appears at 19

WASH.

L. REv. 133.

9o July 24, 1943, p. 94.

1Monsanto Chemical Company, NWLB No. 292, August 17, 1942.

92 12 LAz. REL. REP. 97, March 22, 1943.
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The Monsanto case was precedent .for denials predicated upon the
same policy, but the directive used in subsequent cases was modified
to provide a definite period at the end of which the Board would
reconsider the case.9 3 The labor representatives dissented to the denial
for violation of the no-strike pledge, decrying use of the maintenance
award as reward or punishment and urging that its primary function,
and the only one to be considered by the Board, was to promote
solidarity. The majority disavowed an intent to punish the uniop but
explained its position as being one which would not give security to
irresponsible unions-irresponsibility being shown by violation of the
no-strike agreement. In the Chrysler case,94 maintenance was withheld for numerous wartime strikes and a permanent umpire was
appointed to handle arbitration. The employers presented a completely documented brief containing evidence of union irresponsibility
and instability which left the "NWLB no alternative except to refuse
the union's demand for mm."9 5 This particular decision was all the
more notable because the Board had not made much use of the
policy laid down in the Monsanto case after the first few weeks
of its existence.
It is not difficult for the Board to find mitigating 'circumstances
which distinguish the cases sufficiently to permit a modification of
the general policy to withhold' security until the union proves its
responsibility. Despite a record of irresponsibility including a strike
before Pearl Harbor and a poor attitude after the entry of the
United States into the war, a maintenance clause was granted in the
Allis-Chalmers case. 96 The only restriction in the provision was a
clause requiring voluntary assumption of membership maintenance by
individual members before they would be bound. In view of the
extreme record of irresponsibility and failure to cooperate, falling just
short of actual strike, it appears that the Board will countenance any
activity which is not an actual violation of the labor pledge 7
Where stoppages have occurred but the union officials have cooperated to prevent them, security will not be withheld, although it will be
granted subject to withdrawal. 8 If the union officials are acting
in good faith but wildcat strikes occur contrary to their direction,
maintenance of membership will allow the union to gain more control
over their members to the end that further work stoppages will be
prevented.99 Those cases in which security is denied because of
03General Chemical Company, NWLB No. 267, September 19, 1942;
Pettibone Mulliken Corporation, NWLB No. 326, October 20, 1942.
"Chrysler Corporation, NWLB No. 3950-D (960), August 27, 1943.
°"BusmEsS WEmr, August 28, 1943, p. 98.
1"Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, NWLB No. 211, March
30, 1943.
"7Regional boards are more strict, see 13 LAB. REL. REP. 505, 582.
IsSement Solvay Company, NWLB No. 547, March 19, 1943.
"9See 11 LAB. E. REP. 497.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

19

strikes even though the union leaders declare that the strikes were
unauthorized'0 0 are explainable by the amount of assistance to prevent work stoppages given by the union leaders. The opinions do not
make the distinction clear, but apparently active cooperation by
union leaders will overcome the effect of the work stoppage so that
maintenance will be awarded. It is not the duration of the work
stoppage, but the spirit and intent of the union leaders that is most
important in these cases. Depending upon the circumstances of the
individual case, the Board will withhold the union maintenance award
during a probationary period, grant it conditionally or will grant the
standard clause without any condition.
A second reason for denying union security, resorted to only by
the regional boards, is the provisions of the union by-laws. If they
are considered "dangerous" or undemocratic, the award is not made.
The Boston Regional Board denied the clause when it was shown that
under the by-laws the members would be fined, suspended or expelled
for (1) making false statements about an officer or member, (2) being
profane, arguing or refusing to obey the chairman at union meetings,
or (3) making public what went on at the union meeting. These
regulations were denounced by the Boston Board as "too loosely
defined" for the safety of the members. 1' 1 If workers were forced to
remain members in order to keep their position, the union boss would
be given great power under these by-laws. Later, when the by-laws
were revised, the Board granted maintenance of membership. The
Detroit Board refused to deny union maintenance on the basis of
dangerous by-laws as the threat was only potential-not actual. Said
the Detroit Board, "Should this union act arbitrarily in expelling
members and then insist that they be discharged under the union
maintenance of membership provision, it may be that this Board
should cancel union maintenance of membership. In the absence of
a showing that the union has acted in this fashion, we deem the
argument presented by the industry member of the panel to be
unsound."10

2

To date no case has been found in which the National

Board was confronted with this problem, but the prediction is hazarded
that it would follow the Detroit Board. The position taken by the
Boston Board is subject to the criticism that the agency is interfering
in internal union affairs, a criticism the National Board would seek
to avoid if possible.
To summarize, maintenance of membership will be denied if the
union has engaged in war-time work stoppages unless they are wildcat
in nature and contrary to the directions of the union officials.
10oBorg-Warner

Corporation, NWLB No. 517, March 15, 1943.
WEEK, July 24, 1943,

"112 LAB. REL. REP. 739, July 19, 1943; Busniss
p. 94.
102

13 LAB.

REL.

REP. 300, November 15, 1943.
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Though union responsibility is made a basis of the maintenance award,
union irresponsibility is not a basis for denying the security in every
instance, but there must be a showing of special circumstances to
warrant the denial.
THE CLAUSE IN ACTION

The standard clause, with the fifteen-day escape provision, still
is the usual form of maintenance award but there have been many
variations, in keeping with the Board's declaration that each case is
to be decided on its own facts and no decision is to be considered
binding precedent. Where the Board is convinced that maintenance
is not enough, it might combine that clause with the check-off of
dues, a preferential hiring provision or some other device to achieve
the balance between employer and employee status which will result
in the balance of power conducive to most effective production
effort.
It is a general policy of the Board not to add a maintenance
provision to the preferential hiring clause, or vice versa, but special
circumstances in the labor market will cause it to grant both regulations.
In the Shell Oil Company case" the union had a preferential hiring
contract, but maintenance was granted in addition because standards
of the company forced it to reject many of the applicants submitted
by the union and the shrunken labor market made it impossible to
furnish employees within the 24-hour period required by the hiring
clause. Denial of this same provision in subsequent disputes has
usually been based on the fact that no "special circumstances" were
shown. There has been no misuse of this provision and the Board
has rigorously opposed the combination of security clauses unless it
was convinced that the war effort demanded such measures. The
effect of maintenance combined with check-off will be discussed infra;
it is sufficient to indicate at this point that the check-off is frequently
combined with maintenance as the two have complementary functions
to perform.
An insignificant modification of the standard clause was made at
the request of Crittall-Federal, Inc. 01- which desired a statement in
the maintenance provision to the effect that the provision was
included solely at the direction of the Board. This is cited merely
to indicate that the Board is willing to cooperate with whatever
individualized policies do not impede its major objectives.
A more important modification is the one worked oui in the
General Petroleum Corporation case. 05 The clause awarded required
that at least 51 per cent of the companies' maritime employees be
103 Shell Oil Company, Inc., NWLB No. 288 (2416-D), June 1, 1943.

Critall-Federal, Inc., NWLB No. 2291-D, April 24, 1943.
General Petroleum Corp., et al, NWLB No. 111-315-C, November
1, 1943.
1

10
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union members. This percentage was determined by the number of
employees who had been union members at the time of an NLRB
election held in 1942. Pacific Coast unions had generally worked
under contracts that gave them a much higher degree of security than
did this one recommended by the Board. The special circumstances
of the shipping industry make maintenance of membership impracticable, but the clause here ordered allows the employer complete
freedom of hiring so long as he has the correct percentage of union
men. By this means, the unions are assured a certain stability and
at the same time the employer is not bound unnecessarily so as to
make it impossible for him to operate.
After a year of experience with the standard clause, the Board
found it advisable to add procedural requirements making more
definite the administration of the clause. This was done by adding
a provision that employees might get full information as to the operation of union maintenance and to protect them against possible
coercion by the union or unwarranted discharges under the clause.
The notice advising employees of their rights, including the right to
withdraw during the escape period, may be posted by either party,
and the actual date of expiration of this period is included where
formerly the clause read "15 days after the date of the directive
order." Procedure was established for taking disputes over union
membership to an arbitrator, giving notice of delinquency in dues
payments and a time in which to pay up before suspension. 106 Under
the original clause, many disputes arose over various administrative
phases and the unions contended, in some cases, that the employers
attempted to encourage resignations during the escape period while
the employers countered with the charge that the unions coerced the
men into continued membership or withheld adequate explanations
from them so that they did not know of their right to withdraw. The
more detailed provisions of the revised provision were drawn up in
the light of these complaints and clarify the points of difference by
placing definite responsibility on union and management. Regional
boards had broken the ground by ordering that notices be posted informing the employees in simple language of the terms of the order and
their rights under it.107
The standard clause provides that retention of membership in good
standing is a condition of employment but some of the maintenance
provisions are not so worded. However, it is the duty of the
employer to discharge employees who have lost good standing,
regardless of the terms of the provision in the contract. This was
decided in the Kennecott Copper Corporation08 dispute, involving
106 13 LAB. REL. REP. 405, December 6, 1943; National Carbon Milk Company, Inc., NWLB No. 111-799-D (V-D-85), November 25, 1943.
1 12 LAB. REL. REP. 738, July 19, 1943.
os 12 LAB. REL. REP. 769, July 26, 1943.
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one-third of the employees. The employer wrote letters to the
delinquent employees and offered to check off dues, on a voluntary
basis, but the maintenance clause without the discharge provision
has the same effect as the standard clause and dues delinquency must
result in discharge. Procedure worked out for handling delinquent
members under the standard clause involves a report by the union of
delinquent members, a warning to these members, a hearing before a
joint union-management committee in cases of continued delinquency,
followed by discharge of the employee or, if coercion is claimed,
arbitration of the issue followed by the arbitrator's decision. This
provides the employer an opportunity to know whether employees
actually are delinquent and provides the employee notice and hearing
so that he cannot be wrongfully discharged under the maintenance
provision.
The maintenance provision has been used to avoid the job freeze.
Workers desiring to leave a position had simply to become delinquent
in membership, whereupon the employer was forced to discharge them.
Of course, W-MC rulings and draft board regulations controlled this
practice to a certain extent, but the practice did gain headway in
some areas. The Atlanta Regional Board met the challenge with an
unusual provision designed to protect the employer from such tactics.
The Board included within the standard maintenance clause the
proviso that the union had to furnish competent and acceptable
substitutes before workers could be discharged for lapse in union
membership.1 0 9
The escape provision of the standard maintenance clause operates
to permit a union employee to resign from the union, during a given
period, without jeopardizing his right to continue his employment.
Under a maintenance clause without the escape period, any severance
of union affiliations must, according to the terms of the maintenance
clause, result in a worker's discharge. After the standard clause had
been in use for some months, the question arose as to whether an
escape clause should be included in the renewal contract. Because of
the hundreds of cases in which union maintenance has been awarded,
the problem was very important to the unions since all of the stability
and status they had attained under the maintenance clause might be
lost in the fifteen-day period between contracts during which time
workers could resign. The Board ruled that the escape clause should
be contained in the renewal contract on the theory that the original
maintenace clause was binding only for the duration of the contract and
as a matter of principle the employees should be given a chance to
resign from the union upon termination of the contract." 0 However,
100 13 LAB. PamL. RP.
10

138, Oct. 4, 1943.

Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company, NWLB No. 25-390-D,
111-2612-D, October 30, 1943.
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before resigning under an escape provision, the member must pay
all back dues."" This involves the concept of living up to one's
obligations and raises no legal question.
A more detailed work would include further examples of complications and the manner in which the Board has adjusted its rulings to
cover the particular circumstances. The foregoing discussion briefly
indicates some of the problems that have arisen under the maintenance
of membership provision but it does not purport to be exhaustive.
It must be borne in mind when considering the War Labor Board's
rulings that each opinion speaks only for itself, though there are
general principles and policies governing the action of the agency.
Generally, the principles in this field of the Board's activities stem
from the policy of granting maintenance unless some reason is
shown why it should be denied and formulating all regulations to the
end that the rights of the union, the management and the individual
will be harmonized.
LEGALITY OF TE

CLAUSE

Under the War Labor Disputes Act," 2 the War Labor Board is
required to conform to the terms of the Wagner Act, which raises the
question as to whether maintenance of membership is in violation of
the earlier labor legislation. By section 8(3) of the Wagner Act
it is made an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization, though an employer
specifically is empowered to "require, as a condition of employment,
membership" in a union (i. e., closed shop). The War Labor Board
and its predecessor, the National Defense Mediation Board, have
consistently ruled that the maintenance of membership provision is
not contrary to this section of the Wagner Act. The position of their
counsel is that the exception which legalized the closed shop extended
also to maintenance. Though maintenance is not as broad as the
closed or union shop, as to those members who are in good standing
at the expiration of the escape period, the company can "require, as
a condition of employment" continued membership. In fact, the
preferential hiring clause, which is less than closed shop, has been
3
upheld by the courts."1
The statement from the general attorney of NLRB, Mr. Watts,
was given upon request from the WLB when the Federal Shipbuilding
and Drydock Company challenged the Board's power to grant a
maintenance contract." 4 The majority opinion u 5 in the case did not

1,13

LAB. REL. REP. 331, November 22, 1943

(order of the Shipbuilding

Commission).
"-

Sec. 7 (a) (2).

"'Peninsular & Occidental Shipping Co. v. NLRB, 98 F. (2d) 411 (CAA
5) cert. denied 305 U. S. 653.
114 10 LAB. REL. REP. 317, May 4, 1942.
I Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Company, iNWLB No. NDMB 46,
April 27, 1942.
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get down to fundamentals but stated that "Our Congress, our courts
and our history make the answer that our democracy can lawfully,
make war to save our democracy." However, Chairman Davis, in a
concurring opinion, set forth the points in clear detail: He listed the
company's objections as two: (1) that it is contemplated by the
NLRA proviso that closed or union shops are the only ones and so
that maintenance or anything else is illegal on the construction theory
that when Congress expresses approval to one thing it excludes the
legality of the other alternatives and (2) that by providing such an
agreement, Congress precluded any other method by which the obligation of a maintenance clause might come into effect. These he
answered with three points: (1) with respect to the first contention
namely that the proviso necessitated the conclusion that only a
closed shop is legitimate under the statute, the answer- seems to be
that the whole includes its parts as a matter of common sense construction. Certainly it is anomolous for some one who is opposed to
a maintenance clause to base his argument against the clause on the
ground that Congress by a statute permits only a closed shop because
the Board undoubtedly would grant closed shops in many cases where
now the maintenance clause is deemed sufficient. (2) With respect
to the second argument it should be observed that the maxim of
construction that where a legislative body expresses itself with respect
to one subject matter, it excludes all other subject matters, is one of
very definite limitations. For example, Mr. Davis suggested that
if Congress passed a statute now making all gambling contracts legal,
it would be fruitless to argue from such a statute that by virtue of its
very existence some other form of contract is illegal. Nor can it
logically be argued, according to this opinion; that by putting its stamp
of approval on an agreed closed shop or some modification of a closed
shop, Congress intended to preclude the Board, in time of war, from
granting a form of union security which meets the practical needs of
the war situation. (3) Lastly, he propounded, the National Labor
Relations Act is in truth the buckler of labor and it clearly was not
the intent of Congress that the buckler should be thrown away in
time of war and turned against labor by ingenious legal arguments.
The Board proceeded on the above outlined theory and granted
maintenance in 165 cases prior to the adoption of the ConnallySmith bill. After the early cases had been published the authority of
the Board to award maintenance was not seriously challenged, which
is perhaps some indication of the belief in its validity. But during
the discussion preceding the passage of the Connally-Smith bill, the
powers of the War Labor Board were examined and a proposal was
made to ban the use of the maintenance provision. This proposal was
defeated by an overwhelming vote. From these facts, counsel of
I
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the War Labor Board argue"' that the unqualified intent of Congress
in adopting section 7(a) (2) of the War Labor Disputes Act was to
leave intact the powers which had been exercised by the Board during
the previous 18 months of its existence.
A congressional investigation117 resulted from the split over the
Board's authority under the Disputes Act, with the seven-member
committee dividing 5 to 2 on the subject of the legality of union
maintenance. The majority found that the security device was clearly
contrary to the Wagner Act, hence violative of the Disputes Act. The
minority defended the Board on the same grounds as outlined above.
The minority report is much more convincing because of the detail
which distinguishes it from the majority report. Because of the large
number of cases in which maintenance has been granted, 18 it would
appear that more persuasive arguments against its validity than have
yet been advanced must be urged if the policy is to be struck down by
the courts. Actually, as the directive for the standard clause is
framed, the maintenance provision does come within the language of
the Wagner Act. That language is not unambiguous, perhaps, but
the more persuasive arguments are for resolving the ambiguities in
favor of the clause. 1
1

13

LAB. REL.

REP. 406, December 6, 1943.

Seattle Times, January 26, 1944; 13 LAB. RE.

REP. 647, January 31,
1944.
"1I"The best answer to the question as to whether the War Labor
Board has a maintenance-of-membership policy is in the record. In 291
cases involving maintenance of membership, the National Board, between
January 12, 1941, and February, 1944, decided 271 cases in favor of maintenance of membership and in two cases submitted the issue to a referendum of the employees. The provision was denied in 18 cases. In 817 cases
involving the maintenance of membership the regional boards and commissions decided 783 cases in favor of granting maintenance of membership while in 34 cases the provision was denied by the regional boards
and commissions. From January 12, 1941, to February 29, 1944, the National War Labor Board in 271 decisions provided maintenance of membership for 1,409,050 workers. Between January 21, 1943, and February
29, 1944, the regional boards and commissions, in 783 decisions, granted this
provision to 351,000 workers." Humble Oil & Refining Co., supra n. 54.
""9Until April, 1944, the Board had not considered the question in a
formal opinion, but the Humble Oil & Refining Company decision lists
the bases of authority for the maintenance clause, as follows:
"(1) The national no-strike, no-lockout agreement that the President
establish a national board to settle all labor disputes by peaceful means;
"(2) The Executive Order of the President setting up the tripartite
National War Labor Board to settle all unresolved labor disputes;
"(3) The unanimous decision of the Board, after long and careful consideration, to accept jurisdiction of the union-security issue;
"(4) The unanimous decisions of the Board in 35 cases to grant maintenance of membership as a settlement of this issue and -the unanimous
decision of the Board in cases of non-compliance to call upon the President for enforcement of majority decisions for maintenance of membership;
"(5) The exercise of the war powers of the President for such enforcement;
"(6) The refusal of Congress, in giving legal sanction to the War
Labor Board, to take this authority away from the War Labor Board and
the refusal of Congress to make decisions of the Board subject to judicial
review."
1
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Check-off: A security measure somewhat weaker than the maintenance award is check-off, an agreement between an employer and a
labor organization whereby the employer deducts the union dues from
the pay checks of union employees. The employers contend that
collection of dues is exclusively a union concern. They resent acting
as financial agents to the ultimate benefit of the union because it
increases their overhead through the additional bookkeeping burden
and they are afraid that individual employees who possibly do not
20
desire to pay dues regularly will resent management deductions.1
Neither of these points is very persuasive, however. The bookkeeping
burden placed on the employer is slight when compared with the
burden the union has in collecting from its membership, distributed
over a large area. Moreover, provision is usually made for the
employer to retain a small percentage of total collections as compensation for his services. In normal times, the union's burden would not
be an important consideration, it being one intrinsic to the administration of a union and a union responsibility. But in these present
chaotic times, economic waste can be curtailed by having the employer,
who has records on all employees, check off the dues, thus avoiding
duplication in union and management records and reducing the union
accounting staff to a minimum.
Check-off has been granted only where circumstances indicate that
union stability is dependent upon it and not merely for union convenience. 121 Informed employees will not direct their resentment
against the employer for withholding dues as the employer has no
choice in the matter but must make the deductions according to the
contract. Furthermore, it should not be presumed that a union
member is unwilling to pay his dues and without this presumption there
is no basis for the employers' contention that employees will resent
management deductions. Moreover, the contention of some unions
that check-off is essential to their financial stability is a fact. Union
offices are far from the places of members' employment; communication may be difficult, making dues expensive to collect.

22

The War Labor Board has granted check-off of *union dues in a
large proportion of its' cases. It has been opposed by the companies
on legal grounds of conflict with congressional legislation and with
state laws prohibiting assignment of future wages.' 2 Neither objection has been upheld by the Board; the first overruled on grounds
A dissent by the employer members of the Board questions the authority 2of the Board to issue maintenance of membership directives.
2 °LimERmv,
CoL
mEcTn'
LABOR AGREEMENT (1939) p. 69.
12'Mack Manufacturing Company, NWLB No. 76, September 4, 1942.
122Lieberman, supra n. 61, pp. 69, 70.
1 313 LAB. REL. REP. 186, October 18, 1943 (not violative of Wagner Act
to allow check-off to minority union, if no allegation of company domination: Dallas Board); Little Steel Case, NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, July
16, 1942; Lone Star Cement Corp., NWLB No. 371, November 28, 1942; J.
Greenbaum Tanning Company, NWLB No. 879, August 28, 1943.
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of wartime necessity and absence of fundamental conflict, the second
because the assignment statutes were passed to protect workers against
"loan sharks" and should not now be construed to the disadvantage
of the class they were designed to protect.
Like the maintenance clause, check-off is a flexible device, awarded
in varying forms according to the exigencies of the case. It may be
voluntary or involuntary, revocable or irrevocable, combined with
union maintenance or without it. Where maintenance of membership
is adequate security 124 or where the union already has financial stability,1 25 check-off is denied. Contrary to the position of the Board in
regard to maintenance, check-off will not be granted unless special
need is shown. 1-2 6 Thus, where increased difficulties of dues collecting

due to gasoline rationing were not sufficiently great to weaken the
union, no security was awarded. 2 7 Similarly, where the number of
union employees is relatively small, the necessity for check-off cannot be shown.

28

Or where there is no restriction against collecting

dues on company property, the union has no cause for this security.:29
Usual justification for the award is found either in dues collection difficulties caused by the number of employees, 2 0 widely separated
13
residences of members coupled with weekly payment by check, '
or other similar impediments to collection, or because the employer
2
objects to collections on company time and property.
Voluntary check-off is the type most frequently granted. In the
early cases where check-off was allowed, the Board specified that
written authorization from each employee was a condition precedent
to company deductions."
The unions objected to the requirement
of written authorization on the ground that this would reveal union
membership to the possible prejudice of employees. In Remington
Rand Company, Inc.," 4 the written authorization was made revocable
1-,Norm-Hoffman Bearing Corp., NWLB No. 120, Aug. 24, 1942; Allied
Chemical & Dye Corp., et al, NWLB No. 636, March 27, 1943.
125Cambridge Tile Mfg. Company, NWLB No. 113, Aug. 1, 1942.
126 Oliver Farm Equipment Company, NWLB No. 452, March 30, 1943.

1'7 Robinson Clay Products Co., et al, NWLB No. 736 (2864-D), June
11, 1943.
12 The Lucas Machine Tool Company, NWLB No. 111-204-R, Sept. 3,
1943.
129 Lehigh Portland Cement Company, NWLB No. 111-93-C, Aug. 25,
1943.
130 United States Cartridge Company, St. Louis Ordnance Plant, NWLB
Nos. VII-D-127 (111-1446-D), VII-D-128 (111-1447-D), and Vfl-D-130
(111-1445-D),
Dec. 10, 1943.
131 Wortendyke Manufacturing Company, NWLB No. 3016-D (887),
July 22, 1943.
3 Delta Star Electric Company, NWLB No. 746, April 23, 1943; American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, NWLB No. 111-2637-D, Jan.
6, 1944.
133Marshall Field & Company, NWLB No. 10, Feb. 25, 1942; Bower
Roller Bearing Company, NWLB No. 12, March 11, 1942; Armour Leather
Company, NWLB No. 98, June 10, 1942.
134 NWLB No. 44, April 23, 1942.
8
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upon sixty-day written notice. This pattern has been followed in
other instances, with the period of notice being modified in later
decision.135 The security element in voluntary revocable check-off is
somewhat obscure at first consideration, but actually the workers
would fear publicity likely to result from a refusal to sign, so that
the device has been effective. Where check-off has been combined
with the maintenance award, it is made irrevocable; because the
maintenance clause requires continued membership in good standing,
irrevocable check-off is entirely consistent with it.'
Merger of
irrevocable check-off with maintenance prevents attempts to evade
the job freeze order by denying to the worker an opportunity to
become delinquent. The CIO advocates 37 a more general recognition
that check-off should accompany union maintenance awards. Though
regional boards 3 s have expressed sympathy with this position, the
National War Labor Board has not proceeded on the theory that
check-off is a hand-maiden to maintenance but has employed it as
an independent device and when combined with maintenance it
is because of circumstances justifying more security than maintenance
alone affords.
Compulsory check-off is awarded where union rivalry or management hostility increase the danger to the bargaining union.'39 Moreover, compulsory check-off sometimes is granted with the standard
maintenance clause in the interest of efficiency. 4° Where compulsory
check-off has existed in prior contracts, that furnishes, in itself,
sufficient basis for granting this degree of security. Theoretically,
compulsory check-off in all maintenance cases would be the efficient
and expeditious manner of handling the problem, but a democratic
way of life does not place expediency ahead of personal rights and
convictions. There is merit in the suggestion that check-off destroys
the initiative of the union member since it removes one of the acts
which is normally the result of group membership. Under this
arrangement, the unions themselves are asking the employers to
perform a task which by, its very nature should be performed by
the unions. In this dependence upon outside assistance there is
the danger of weakening or ultimately losing the capacity and power
to bargain. The union which is independent of outside assistance and
depends upon the morale of its members to carry on its activities
-13 Lexington Telephone Company, Inc., NWLB No. AR-43, Feb. 19, 1943;
Texas Company, NWLB No. 571, April 3, 1943.
13Remington Rand, Inc., NWLB No. 424, March 26, 1943; RalstonPurina Company, NWLB No. 503, Oct. 24, 1942; Berwind White Coal Mining Company, NWLB No. 111-456-D, Feb. 1, 1944.
237 CIO Convention, 11 LAB. REL. REP. 333, Nov. 16, 1942.
"'National
Carbon Company, Inc., NWLB No. 111-799-D (V-D-85),
Nov. 25, 1943.
1 Automatic Transportation Company, NWLB No. 442, April 14, 1943.
2 Combustion Engineering Company, Inc., NWLB No. 2855, April 19,
1943; Bethlehem Steel Company, NWLB No. 117, April 21, 1943.
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has a better foundation for post-war advancement than does the
union which requires employer assistance, secured by governmental
order, to collect dues, an essentially intra-union problem. The
deleterious aspects of check-off are not present where the union has
secured the arrangement through bargaining, but third-party directives
do not enhance their status, they only insure a continuation of the
formalities without strengthening the spirit or loyalty fundamental to
successful group achievement.
A security device occasionally employed by the Board is an award
of check-off for all employees, regardless of union membership.' 4'
Union dues, not to exceed a certain fixed sum, are deducted from
all wages, to compensate the union for the benefits it gains for all
workers alike. Where no maintenance provision is in force, the
union may face a loss in membership since all employees enjoy
the advantages derived through collective bargaining, hence no inducements for union membership can be put forward. This has been
circumvented by provisions that the union would represent non-union
as well as union employees, in effect making all employees union
members as to dues and bargaining rights without imposing other
union duties upon the employees. Even where a work stoppage causes
a denial of the maintenance clause, voluntary irrevocable check-off
may be granted, if there are factors present to justify some form of
security. The escape clause has been added to the irrevocable checkoff, in some instances, allowing a worker to revoke, in writing, his
authorization of deductions. As worked out in the Wright Areonautical
Corporation case, 4 a fifteen-day escape period would be allowed at
the end of each contract year, for the duration of the contract. Taking
into consideration the philosophy which inspired the check-off device,
use of the escape clause should be more conducive to union stability
than the revocable check-off provision which results in a degree of
uncertainty as to yearly union income.
That the check-off privilege is purely contractual was determined
by the New Jersey Chancery Court. 14 3 Even though the regularly conducted election resulted in a transfer of affiliation from the AFL
to the CIO, the CIO union could not maintain proceedings to restrain
the employer from turning over to the AFL union dues checked off
under the contract. None of the individual employees asserted any injury
to his individual rights, though the workers did have an interest in
the fund collected for union dues. Had an individual brought the
action, injunction might have issued, but the CIO was not party to
the contract and had no standing to sue.
10 LAB. REL. REP. 195, April 6, 1942.
142NWLB No. 111-1375-D, Oct. 3, 1943.
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UNION SECURITY
APPRAISAL

Prior to the creation of the NDMB, private industry generally had
made little use of union security clauses in the promulgation of
collective bargaining agreements. However, Crown Zellerbach Corporation pioneered in granting union maintenance and a modified checkoff long before the NDMB came into being. Its Director of Industrial
Relations, Alexander R. Heron, stated, after maintenance had been
tested for over five years in more than 30 separate Zellerbach mills
involving nearly 15,000 employees, that it had brought peace in
industrial relations. He summarized:
"A union without this measure of protection must in effect
re-sell itself to every member every month against the threat
that he will not pay his next month's dues. All it can offer
such a member is the effort to secure concessions from the
employer. In actual experience, union committees who have
this 'maintenance of membership' clause behind them show
increasing willingness to distinguish between just and unjust
grievances. They
decline to become errand boys for chronic
'14
complainers.1 4
And in regard to check-off, he wrote:
"We have never signed an agreement providing for checkoff or requiring an employee to join a union. We do protect
a union with which we have a contract in the collection of
its dues, however. If an employee joins such a union of
his own volition, he thereby becomes a party to the agreement, and one of his duties is to maintain his membership in
good standing. In many ways, we have gained more than
the union has from this policy. Previously, the grievance
committee was busy selling the grievance procedure to anyone
who imagined he had a grievance-otherwise the union feared
that dues payments would fall off. When the union no longer
had to coax men to pay their dues, the grievance committees
45
were able to refuse to handle unjustified complaints.'
These statements are peculiarly valuable testimony because they
epitomize the workability of union security, even in times of peace.
Recently, public opinion has taken a more antagonistic turn in regard
to labor unions, the feeling being primarily generated by unionsponsored wartime strikes and demands for increased wages. The,
picture of unionism is complicated, therefore, by the indefinable
character of public response to labor problems colored by emotions
heightened through wartime propaganda. Until military operations
approach a close, and public temper gives way to reasoned opinion, it
is too early to prognosticate. on the fate of unionism. However, the
pre-war labor relations in the Zellerbach mills indicate that some
industrialists have learned the value of joint enterprise and cooperative
149
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effort. The widespread use of security measures, even at governmental
instigation, has given employers, by and large, a new understanding
of the role a responsible union can play in industry. From this
compulsory adoption of union maintenance and similar measures,
labor and management have a factual basis upon which to establish
post-war relations.
Mute evidence of what specialists in the field think of union security
is found in reports released periodically by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics covering War Labor Board recommendations. Although
only about 45 per cent of all workers in private industry work under
collective bargaining agreements, approximately 70 per cent of all
employees working under union contracts are covered by maintenance
clauses, closed shop or union shop provisions. 146 It is significant, however, that the number of employees working under contract is constantly increasing and that the percentage of those working under
union security clauses is also mounting steadily. After approximately
two years of experience, the members of the War Labor Board continue
to rely on union maintenance as a major influence in promoting
production. Its policy of granting security unless some reason is advanced for denying it is extremely convincing evidence of the successful operation of the unions given this support.
An official survey of plants operating under the membership of
maintenance clause was made in the fall of 1943.14' The statistics
gathered in making the survey showed that whereas union membership
had increased, the proportion of union workers to the total number of
employees had remained fairly static. Increase of membership, of
course, was the result of war-time production increases. Union security
has not become the economic boomerang that some of its opponents
feared would result through wide usage of it. Rather, the policies of
the War Labor Board have been vindicated in this survey showing
that the unions have been able to maintain their strength despite unfavorable conditions and at the same time American workers have
retained, to a large extent, their independence of action. Few withdrawals were made during the escape periods and few discharges were
caused by failure to keep up union membership. Where dues delinquency was notoriously bad, the unions did not always take advantage
of the discharge provision of the maintenance clause, so the figures
are not an accurate indication of membership response, but the generalization can safely be made that union maintenance has given stability
to labor organizations. Stability of the unions, in turn, was found to
lead to stability of union-management relations.
21 14 LaB.
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REP. 212, April 24, 1944; 30 per cent of all union contracts

provide for closed shop, 20 per cent grant m of m and 0 per cent grant
union shop.
"113 LAB. EL. REP. 76, Sept. 20, 1943.
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Employers, according to the Bureau's analysis, are reconciled to
maintenance provisions. Their acceptance is, basically founded on a
realization of war-time necessity for harmonious relations. Such a feeling will not have any carry-over into post-war labor treatment unless
the unions prove so cooperative that the employers will desire to continue the harmonious relations. Many employers, even as early as
September, 1943, expressed genuine desire to establish effective collective bargaining relations. This can only be done by having strong
and intelligent unions meeting as equals with progressive and understanding employers. Whether maintenance can continue after the
war will depend largely upon the attitude of union leadership now while
it is in a position to prove its responsibility.
In general, the response to War Labor Board supervision has been
satisfactory. There are some outstanding instances of opposition predicated upon a belief that the Board supersedes its authority by granting union security. But the labor versus management attitude is so
firmly embedded in the American capitalistic system that it is only
natural to have opposition in these days of transition in labor relations
philosophy. "Cooperation," has become an ideal only within the last
couple of decades. Whatever the fate of union security after the
disbandment of the War Labor Board, it is believed that the principle
will not be cast aside but will be used in giving greater stability to the
unions. The lessons learned about security clauses as administered 'by
the War Labor Board will undoubtedly be employed in drafting postwar labor contracts. But if the unions are to achieve the goals toward
which they have been working since their inception, it is necessary
that they rely on their own initiative, both now and in the future.

